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The Origins of Socially and Politically 
Hostile Attitudes tONard Immigrants 
and Outgroups: Economics, Ideology, or 
National Context? 
Gregory D. Saxton 
College at Brockport , State University of New York 
Michelle A. Benson 
University at Buffalo , State University of New York 
Anal y ses of the determinants of anti-immigrant hostility 
remain underdeveloped in th e literature . Current re-
search is diminished by comp eting claims over the pri-
ma cy of economic , ideological , contextual, or socio-
demographic factors . To consolidate past research and 
work towards a more coherent theory of attitudinal hos-
tility, we argue that it is first necessary to disaggregate 
the broad notion of hostility into "social" and "policy " 
hostility . We use the 30 t h Eurobarometer on Immigrants 
an d Outgroups to test the ability of the economic vulner-
abili ty, ideology , and national context arguments to ex-
plain levels of socially and politically hostile attitudes to 
immigrants in five countries of the European Union . The 
resul ts confirm that not only are social and policy hostil-
ity distinct , but ideological factors-both new and old -
provide a more cogent account of hostility than either 
economics or national context . The study finds that atti-
tudinal hostility fundamentally derives from a conjunc-
tion of low levels of education and a powerful form of 
"ideological hostility " that encompasses old-fashioned 
racism, traditional right-wing ideology, and materialist 
value orientations . . 
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The last two decades of the twentieth century saw a wave of ugly anti-immigrant backlashes in Western Europe. Coming as they did after a decade of high unemployment 
and working-class insecurity, many popular analysts reached the 
conclusion that "hard times breed hard thoughts." Whatever the 
association, parties of the "new radical right" (Kitschelt 1995), 
such as Belgium's Vlaams Blok, France's Front National and 
Germany's Republikaner, have been able to parlay the conflu-
ence of economic insecurity and anti-foreigner sentiment into a 
viable electoral message. 
Some ( e.g., Dalton 1990) argue that such hostile attitudes are 
inextricable concomitants of the economic and social transfor-
mations of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
They argue that in the postindustrial economy there are a large 
and growing number of individuals in insecure social and eco-
nomic positions; ipso facto, there will be a large and growing 
hostility to the presence of "foreigners" in the domestic economy 
and society. The argument has strong intuitive appeal. Still, oth-
ers have persuasively argued that either ideological predisposi-
tions (Hoskin 1985, 1991; Pettigrew 1998) or nation-specific 
factors (Kitschelt 1995; Lahav 1997; Legge 1996; Schmitter 
1983; Studlar 1977) are the primary determinants of hostile atti-
tudes to immigrant "outsiders" in the European Union. 
Which explanation is most powerful? We attempt to provide 
an answer by testing and comparing the ability of the economic 
vulnerability, ideology, and national context arguments to ex-
plain levels of attitudinal hostility in five of the most developed 
nations of Western Europe. Using data derived from the German, 
British, French, Belgian, and Dutch sections of Eurobarometer 
30 (Reif and Melich 1991 ), that focused on the issue of immi-
grants and outgroups, we demonstrate, first, that attitudinal hos-
tility can be usefully disaggregated into distinct "social" and 
"policy" dimensions. Results from multiple regression analyses 
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on social and policy hostility then show that ideology, in con-
junction with education, offers a more powerful explanation of 
hostility than either economic vulnerability or national context. 
TIIEORETICALBACKGROUND 
The countries of Western Europe have never considered 
themselves "immigrant" nations (Pettigrew 1998). Instead, they 
were historically "emigrant" nations-filling the cities of North 
America with their opportunity-hungry masses. Because of this 
perception, these countries lacked a sense that immigration was 
normal (Pettigrew 1998). After World War II, however, levels of 
immigration in northern Europe ( especially in France, the Neth-
erlands, and the United Kingdom) steadily increased as migrants 
from former colonial countries began to arrive in large numbers. 
Around the same time, beginning in the 1950s, the post-war eco-
nomic boom left the countries of northern Europe with looming 
labor shortages. The call went out for workers from the south of 
Europe (and, later, from the Maghreb and Turkey) to migrate 
north and temporarily fill the positions needed to keep the boom 
going. 
Significant problems with such arrangements first surfaced in 
the 1970s, when the oil shocks led to high rates of inflation, de-
creased economic growth, and persistent high unemployment 
rates. By the early 1980s, most of the rich states of northern and 
Western Europe awoke to the realization that they had become 
immigrant societies. It became exceedingly clear that neither the 
ex-colonial immigrants nor the guestworkers (nor, later on, the 
refugees) were going home. Lacking both an immigrant tradition 
and a popular "melting pot" metaphor directed at the assimila-
tion of foreign-born groups (Pettigrew 1998), tensions began to 
escalate while political solutions were debated. 
Scholars have responded by focusing on the hardships faced 
by the foreign-born migrants in integrating themselves into the 
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new immigrant societies of Western Europe (e.g., Castles and 
Kosack 1985; Hoskin 1991; Hollifield 1992). One of the most 
troubling developments to receive attention has been the rise of 
hostility to these "new Europeans" (Pettigrew 1998). Though the 
range of concepts covered under the rubric of "hostility" in these 
studies is quite broad, most of the literature can be associated 
with one of three primary forms of hostility: (1) physical, (2) 
electoral, and (3) attitudinal. 
Forms of Hostility 
Physical Hostility. We are all familiar with such repugnant 
images as young neo-Nazi thugs thrashing Turkish immigrants in 
German marketplaces. Because of the severity and sensational-
ism of the actions of this relatively small core of right-wing ex-
tremists, physical hostility has garnered a large portion of the 
attention in both the popular and academic literature ( e.g., 
Bjorgo and Witte 1993; Koopmans 1995; Willems 1995; Witte 
1995). Though some of these studies focus on the impact of 
physical and psychological hardship resulting from economic 
distress (e.g., McLaren 1999), the majority take anomie and the 
lack of social capital among disaffected youth as central explana-
tory variables (e.g., Hagan, Merkens and Boehnke 1995). 
Electoral Hostility. There is also a relatively large literature 
dealing with the causes of electoral manifestations of hostility as 
seen in the rising vote for the new radical right parties in most 
West European countries (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Pettigrew 
1998; von Beyme 1988). Many of these studies have focused on 
the correlations between hostile attitudes and physical hostility 
and votes for anti-immigrant political parties. For example, von 
Beyme (1988, I 4) found that there is a disparity between right-
wing voting and right-wing attitudes. Another study on the rise 
of the far right in the former West Germany revealed the basic 
similarity between certain Republikaner and Christian Democ-
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ratic voters, who in turn are both quite distinct from the voters 
for the extreme neo-Nazi German National Democratic Party 
(Kuechler 1990, 160). 
Attitudinal Hostility. Other examinations focus on that pre-
sumably large minority of the citizenry who hold hostile attitudes 
towards foreigners. These citizens are likely behind the rise of 
the new radical right parties, and many may even tacitly support 
the actions of the physically violent extremists. In effect, attitu-
dinal hostility is often presumed to be a precondition for both 
physical and electoral hostility. Attitudinal hostility, however, is 
itself so broad that-in the interests of theory building-it is es-
sential to further delineate the concept. 
Categories of Hostile Attitudes 
Racism. In general, there are three main categories of hostile 
attitudes. Racism (feelings of cultural, ethnic, or racial superior-
ity) is the first, and the basest, of the hostile sentiments. It is, 
presumably, a fundamental pre-detenninant of both electoral and 
physical hostility. We posit that it is also an antecedent condition 
for other fonns of attitudinal hostility; preliminary evidence by 
Pettigrew (I 998) corroborates this. A great deal of research has 
been conducted on the detenninants of this traditional fonn of 
prejudice (e.g., Meertens and Pettigrew 1997), especially in the 
American context (for a good overview, see Snidennan and Pi-
azza 1993). 
Social Hostility. A second sub-category of hostile attitudes is 
the negative affect that people may have towards societal out-
groups in their community. One of the primary manifestations of 
such hostility is negative opinions regarding the impact that im-
migrants have on the host society. Because of the hostility to the 
societal impact of a minority group's presence, we refer to this as 
"social" hostility. Measures designed to tap such negative as-
sessments (for good examples, see Hoskin 1985 and Quillian 
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1995) are often based on responses to the following types of sur-
vey instruments: "Having Turks in your neighborhood lowers 
your property value"; "Turks exploit social security benefits;" 
and "Their presence is one of the causes of delinquency and vio-
lence." 
Policy Hostility. While social hostility taps hostile assess-
ments of immigrants' value to or impact on society, policy hostil-
ity taps support for hostile actions towards those immigrants in 
the policy arena. Such hostility manifests itself primarily through 
support for government policies designed to curtail the political 
or economic rights of the immigrant and outgroup minorities. 
Policy hostility measures attitudes concerning the proper politi-
cal treatment of Europe's millions of non-permanent residents; 
such feelings are, consequently, relevant for this study. 
There would seem to be a connection between negative as-
sessments of a minority's impact on society and support for hos-
tile immigration policies. However, are the determinants of 
social and policy hostility really the same? Neiman and Fernan-
dez (1998), used surveys tapping attitudes towards the growing 
legal and illegal immigrant communities in California to show 
that the answer is "not necessarily." In California, at least, there 
is a significant difference between respondents' assessments of 
an immigrant group's general impact on society and respondents' 
preferences for state policies directed at that group (e.g., Califor-
nia's Proposition 187). One form of hostility does not automati-
cally translate into the other. 
Both social and policy hostility would, ostensibly, also be 
highly correlated with the first form of attitudinal hostility, ra-
cism. We posit that social and policy hostility is shaped by racist 
attitudes. 1 The relationships are not deterministic, however. Nei-
1 Evidence of the connection between prejudice and attitudes regarding immigrants' 
rights is provided by Meertens and Pettigrew ( 1997). 
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ther social nor policy hostility is fully dependent on hostile racist 
attitudes. If, for example, one agrees with the statement that 
property values go down when minorities move into the 
neighborhood (indicative of socially hostile attitudes), it could 
simply be an acknowledgment of other peoples' prejudices. 
Similarly, hostile policy preferences are not necessarily the direct 
product of blind prejudice (and, in fact, are even further removed 
from such sentiments than social hostility). In the United States, 
for example, there are many Hispanic Americans among the sup-
porters of clampdowns on illegal immigration. Consequently, 
racism is construed as one of many antecedent conditions of so-
cial and policy hostility. 
In short, we have identified two forms of attitudinal hostility 
that are worthy of individual attention. Nevertheless, despite the 
fact that socially and politically hostile attitudes are highly rele-
vant to the day-to-day quality of life of millions of EU residents 
without secure citizenship status, the extant literature remains 
underdeveloped. The present study aims to help correct this defi-
cit through an in-depth examination of the determinants of social 
and policy hostility. 
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ATIITUDINAL HOSTILITY 
There are three main approaches to explaining cross-national 
differences in attitudinal hostility: (1) national context, (2) eco-
nomics, and (3) ideology. 
National Context 
Explanations that focus on non-economic nation-specific fac-
tors come in two varieties . The first variety is primarily idio-
graphic; it searches for the roots of hostility in the particular 
psychology, history, or political culture of a nation. Such studies 
are frequently directed at Germany, where analysts argue that 
xenophobic attitudes are attributable to "German identity" 
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(Legge 1996), to renewed manifestations of "authoritarian" 
German personality traits,2 to a lack of support for the current 
system, 3 or to expressions of a "latent" German racism. While 
such may have been the case in the past, these arguments now 
seem rather tenuous: there is a plethora of counter-evidence out-
lining the strength of German support for democratic institutions 
and the comparability of such support with other West European 
and North American nations ( e.g., von Beyme 1988; Dalton 
1990). 
A second type of nation-specific explanation looks to the 
more readily comparable social, legal, economic, political, or 
demographic factors apparent in a given nation for answers to 
the quandary of attitudinal hostility. For example, Donley Studlar 
( 1977) found a reasonable explanation of hostility in Great Brit-
ain using his notion of "social context," which Studlar took to be 
the conjunction of spatial proximity, employment levels, and 
housing shortages. Subsequently, myriad country-specific studies 
have focused on Germany, where the emphasis is usually on such 
features as the asylum law, the unresolved status of the Gastar-
beiter, the size of the refugee flows, or inadequate housing, inter 
alia (for an overview, see Schmitter 1983). 
The contextual factors explored in such studies are amenable 
to cross-national examination. Scholars have met with varying 
degrees of success investigating the cause of the differences in 
anti-immigrant hostility among "host" West European nations by 
comparing institutions, political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 
1995), refugee laws, political party affiliations and systems (La-
2 For instance, Kuechler ( I 990, 159): "I assert that the emergence of the Republikaner 
signifies the continued-though long latent- prevalence of authoritarian belief systems 
in significant parts of the German public." 
3 The classic example of this comes from Almond and Verba (I 963, 429): "Though there 
is relatively widespread satisfaction with political output, this is not matched by more 
general system affect." 
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hav 1997), economic conditions (Quillian 1995), employment 
levels, and the relative size of immigrant populations (Quillian 
1995). 
Admittedly, it is plausible that the national context has a rele-
vance to and impact on manifestations of hostility. Nevertheless, 
a priori theoretical expectations for this explanation are low: we 
predict that prime causality is not due to conditions--whether 
political or cultural-that are peculiarly "German," "French," or 
"Dutch." The fact that hostility is endemic to the states of north-
ern and Western Europe at comparable levels suggests that better 
answers to the problem are found in more universal conditions. 
Economic Vulnerability 
One of the key universal conditions affecting Western Euro-
pean countries in the 1980s and 1990s was the increasing insecu-
rity of individuals employed in traditional economic sectors. 
Hans-Georg Betz argues that the rapid modernization and global-
ization of domestic industries in those two decades led to the 
creation of a "two-thirds society" in which the prosperity and 
security of a large majority in certain core industries came at the 
expense of a "marginalized periphery" with insecure and under-
paid positions (1990, 48). Accompanying the economic trans-
formation was the creation of new sets· of social forces divided 
along the "two-thirds" dichotomy. On the one hand, much of the 
majority of the population has moved beyond economic concerns 
and come to embrace "postmaterial," quality-of-life issues (In-
glehart 1997). On the other hand, the Modemisierungsverlierer 
("losers of modernization"}-the young, the elderly, the unedu-
cated, farmers, and unskilled and semi-skilled workers-have 
purportedly turned en masse to the parties of the new radical 
right in an "expression of protest over unrepresented political 
demands" (Dalton 1990, 174). A variation on this theme attrib-
utes the hostility of these groups more explicitly to economic 
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self-interest and inter-group competition, arguing that it is the 
endemic population who are most likely to face direct job com-
petition from foreign and immigrant labor (e.g., Glazer and 
Moynjhan 1970; Bonacich 1972; Bobo 1983; see Sears and Funk 
1991 for an overview). From either the economic competition or 
industrial modernization perspectives, however, those workers in 
the most vulnerable economic positions are posited to manifest 
the hlghest level of hostility to foreign and immigrant labor. 
Economic vulnerability arguments have found significant 
support in the literature. For example, in their study on class and 
guestworkers in Western Europe, Castles and Kosack (1985) 
concluded that working-class hostility towards guestworkers in 
Western Europe was a product of the need to protect social and 
economic interests threatened by the presence of foreign workers 
in the marketplace. As early as the late 1960s, Butler and Stokes 
(1974) found that concerns with unemployment were highly cor-
related with negative attitudes towards immigrants. More recent 
studies have similarly found elevated levels of hostility among 
individuals with less optimistic assessments of their economic 
situation (Hoskin 1985; Institut fiir angewandte Sozialwissen-
schafl 1987; Legge 1996; Pettigrew 1998). These studies are 
consistent with studies conducted in the American context that 
have shown a strong connection between hostility and percep-
tions ofthe economy (Harwood 1983; Simon 1987). 
The literature suggests that there are two general types of 
economic vulnerability connected to anti-immigrant hostility. 
The first-the "losers of modernization" vulnerability-reflects 
individual positions that are vulnerable from an objective stand-
point. The second kind of vulnerability deals with subjective as-
sessments of individual insecurity and vulnerability. Since there 
is not necessarily a connection between structure and attitudes, 
these two indicators can be considered both operationally and 
conceptually distinct. To determine their relative importance and 
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their particular effect on hostility, both forms of economic vul-
nerability are used in the present study. 
Ideology and Value Orientation 
The findings on economic vulnerability have been contra-
dicted by other studies that have found economic variables to be 
relatively insignificant. For example, Quillian (1995, 587-588) 
argues that, "The empirical evidence on prejudice .. . demonstrates 
only a weak link between individual interests and preju-
dice .. . [economic] self-interest theories cannot explain the exis-
tence of prejudice among individuals whose interests are not 
directly in conflict with the subordinate group." Many of the 
studies that question the economics-hostility connection place 
heavy emphasis on a variety of forms of ideological attributes. 
To begin with, there are those who look to traditional left-right 
identification for explanations of a willingness to accept immi-
grants and other minorities. Hoskin (1985), Meertens and Petti-
grew ( 1997), and Pettigrew (1998), for example, all found that 
the more prejudiced against immigrants in Europe tended to be 
more conservative politically, while Lahav (1997) discovered 
that party affiliations and traditional ideological orientations 
were the most important determinants of attitudes towards the 
immigration issue, at least among elites. 
Sill others have postulated that new forms of value orienta-
tion, especially Inglehart's (1997) "postrnaterialism" thesis, are 
better at explaining a range of attitudinal attributes, including 
hostility to outsiders. Hoskin (1985, 194), for one, has posited 
that attitudinal hostility is "unrelated to personal economic situa-
tion [or] . .. to traditional polit1cal factors such as partisanship or 
ideological position ." Instead, hostility to or acceptance of guest-
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workers is a subset of the "New Politics"4 that cuts across party, 
class, and interest lines. Hoskin's initial findings in Germany 
(1985)--confirmed in other surveys she conducted in the mid-
l 980s in Britain, Canada, Germany, and the United States 
(1991)-for the most part support her New Politics thesis: weak 
associations of the economic variables were consistently over-
shadowed by value orientation in the creation of anti-immigrant 
attitudes. Our study helps to evaluate the competing claims: the 
"new" and "old" ideology hypotheses are directly pitted both 
against each other and against the competing economic and na-
tional context arguments. 
Socio-Demographic Factors 
In addition to the above theoretical explanations, a sizable 
body of research has evolved that highlights the role that age and 
education play in the determination of hostile attitudes to outsid-
ers. In general, these studies have shown that more prejudiced 
Europeans tend to be older and less educated (e.g., Adorno et al. 
1982; Hoskin 1985, 1991; Billiet and Carton 1991; Pettigrew 
1998). 
DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT 
Our study relies on data gathered in the fall of 1988 for Ger-
many, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom for the Eurobarometer Survey 30.5 The Barometer included 
4 According to the "New Politics" hypothesis , traditional political fault lines are gradually 
being overshadowed by a new set of divisions, the most important of which involves 
materialist-postmaterialist value orientations. 
5 In selecting cases for the analysis, the most important determinant was to use states in 
which immigration patterns (in terms of periods and levels) and income levels were rela-
tively similar . The criterion excludes Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, which 
were in the past either considerably poorer than the other countries of the EU, the primary 
sources of immigrants and guestworkers to other countries, or both. For this reason, our 
Note continues 
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a series of questions relating to attitudes towards immigrants and 
"outgroups',6 in the member states of the European Union. 
Independent Variables 
The Eurobarometer 30 data includes ample content for opera-
tionalizing a wide range of economic, socio-demographic, and 
ideological variables. Descriptive statistics for all variables are 
available in Appendix A. The first theoretical alternative, na-
tional context, was operationalized through dummy variables for 
each of the five countries. 
Six indicators were used to test the subjective and objective 
economic vulnerability hypotheses. First, income, social class, 
and occupation were used to operationalize the notion of objec-
tive economic vulnerability. Income is a four-category variable 
(with values from 1 to 4) based on respondents' self-placement 
in one of four income quartiles, from lowest to highest. Higher 
scores equal higher incomes. Similarly, Social Class is derived 
from an indicator that asked respondents to place themselves in 
one of five categories: (1) working class, (2) lower middle class, 
(3) middle class, (4) upper middle class, or (5) upper class.7 Oc-
cupation was operationalized by reconfiguring the categories in 
the Eurobarometer's occupation variable to reflect more accu-
rately vulnerability in the postindustrial economy. Professional 
analysis is limited to the northwestern states of the EU. We have chosen to analyze the 
largest of these cases. The total sample is representative of the populations at large over 
the age of 15 of the five countries. 
6 The "out-groups" in the surveys are country-specific . They refer to those groups that 
have traditionally been least accepted in each of the states. In West Germany the out-
group is the Turks ; in France, North Africans and Southeast Asians; in Netherlands, 
Surinamers and Turks; in Belgium, North Africans and Turks; and in Great Britain, West 
Indians and South Asians. 
7 Although this self-placement is by definition "subjective," the result is more an indica -
tor of a respondent's objective position in the social order than of the individual 's psy-
chologically driven, subjective assessment of personal vulnerability . 
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workers (those originally coded as "professionals" and 
"skilled laborers") were re-coded as "not vulnerable" (value 
= O); unskilled workers (those coded as "manual labor," "un-
skilled manual," or "unskilled office") were re-coded as 
"vulnerable" (value = I); and the unemployed were re-coded 
as "most vulnerable" (value = 2), reflecting their even 
greater degree of occupational insecurity. 
Three discrete variables were likewise used to tap subjec-
tive economic vulnerability. All three of these variables are 
coded such that higher values indicate greater vulnerability 
and insecurity. The first, General Economic Assessment, is 
derived from an item that asks respondents, "How do .you 
think the general economic situation in this country has 
changed over the last 12 months?" Responses to this ques-
tion are coded as (1) "got a lot better," (2) "got a little bet-
ter," (3) "stayed the same," (4) "got a little worse," and (5) 
"got a lot worse." The second variable, Economic Pessi-
mism, is based on a survey item that queried respondents, 
"So far as you are concerned, do you think that next year 
will be better or worse than this year?" Those who responded 
"better" were assigned a value of "l," those who responded 
"the same" were given a score of "2," and those who an-
swered "worse" were assigned a score of "3." Finally, 
Household Economic Situation is based on an item that 
tapped change in household income over the past twelve 
months using the question : "How does the financial situation 
of your household now compare with what it was 12 months 
ago?" The response codes and values are the same as those 
used for the General Economic Assessment: (1) "got a lot 
better," (2) "got a little better," (3) "stayed the same," (4) 
"got a little worse," and (5) "got a lot worse." Together, these 
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three variables provide a good overall assessment of an individ-
ual's subjective economic vulnerability. 8 
For the ideological variables, "traditional" political ideology 
is measured through the Barometer's collapsed left-right self-
placement variable using the following five categories: 1 = ex-
treme left, 2 = left, 3 = center, 4 = right, and 5 = extreme right. 
"New" ideology, in tum, is measured through the survey's three-
category Value Orientation variable (1 = "materialist," 2 = 
"mixed," and 3 = "postmaterialist"). Racism is measured by an 
index based on respondents' reactions to two statements detailing 
possible "reasons for why the outgroup community [i.e., Turks in 
Germany, North Africans in France, etc.] does not do as well as 
nationals [i.e., Germans in Germany]": 
l. "[The outgroup members] come from less 
able races and this explains why they are not 
as well off as most [German] people." 
2. "The cultures of the home countries of [ out-
group membus] are less well developed 
than that of[Germany] ." 
For each statement, respondents could choose from the fol-
lowing list of responses: 1 = "disagree strongly," 2 = "disagree 
somewhat," 3 = "agree somewhat," and 4 = "agree strongly." A 
racism score was created by combining respondents' answers on 
the two items. Values thus range from 2 to 8, with higher values 
indicating more racist attitudes towards outgroups. The racism 
8 The relatively low correlations among these variables suggest that they are capturing 
different segments of an individual's subjective economic assessment (Economic Pessi-
mism and General Economic Assessment correlate at r = 0.20, Economic Pessimism and 
Household Economic Situation correlate at r = 0.26, while General Economic Assessment 
and Household Econ()mic Situation correlate at r = 0.26). 
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variable is a reliable summated sca1e9 and will play an important 
role in the multivariate regressions, given that we are interested 
in the extent to which social and policy hostility operate beyond 
racist attitudes. 
Control Variables 
Three socio-demographic control variables are employed in 
this study-age, education, and ethnicity. Both Age and Educa-
tion are measured using the collapsed four-category items in-
cluded in the Barometer. Age is coded as "1" = 24 years and 
younger, "2" = 25 to 39 years, "3" = 40 to 54 years, and "4" = 55 
years and older. Education is coded according to the age of re-
spondents when they finished their full-time education: "l" = 15 
years of age or younger, "2" = 16 to 19 years year of age, "3" = 
20 years of age or older, and "4" = still studying. Ethnicity uses a 
pre-designed measure meant to tap the respondent's ethnic ori-
gins with the question, "Is anyone in your immediate family, in-
cluding yourself, of foreign national origins?" Values are coded 
as "1" = "outgroup origin," "2" = "other foreign origin," and "3" = 
"not of foreign origin." 
Dependent Variables 
The broad range of items on attitudes towards immigrants and 
guestworkers in Eurobarometer 30 presents the opportunity for 
constructing sophisticated scales for the two dependent variables. 
The desire for a conceptually nuanced analysis led us to choose 
to look at hostility in two distinct manifestations. The first, re-
9 While this index has a great deal of face validity, we also assessed its suitability as a 
summated rating scale by calculating Cronbach's a reliability coefficient Nunally (1978) 
suggests that a coefficients should be around 0.70 for a scale to demonstrate internal 
consistency. Our scale obtained an a of 0.67. This is an acceptable score given the rela-
tively low number of items on our scale, and the tendency for a to increase with higher 
item numbers (Spector 1982). Consequently, we are confident that our scale is a valid 
index of racist attitudes. 
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ferred to as "social hostility," focuses on respondents' assess-
ments of the effect of outsiders on society; the second, referred 
to as "policy hostility," is based on the respondents' attitudes 
about the appropriate political status of those outsiders. 
The Barometer contained eight items that were thought prima_ 
facie to tap social hostility, and three that were thought to meas-
ure policy hostility. In order to corroborate the face validity of 
these assumptions, all eleven items were entered into a factor 
analysis, which confirmed the existence of two distinct factors. 10 
The social hostility indicator is based on a series of eight 
items that ask for respondents' opinions about the outgroup 
members' effect on various aspects of society. In particular, re-
spondents were asked whether each of the following statements 
applied to people of the outgroup nationality residing in the re-
spondent's nation: 
• "If there are a lot of their children in a school it re-
duces the level of education." 
• "They exploit social security benefits." 
• "Their customs are difficult to understand." 
• "Their presence in our country increases unemploy-
ment for [nationals)." 
• "Their presence is one of the causes of delinquency 
and violence." 
• "Marriage into one of these groups always ends 
badly." 
• "To have people of another nationality as neighbors 
creates problems." 
• "The presence of people of another nationality as 
neighbors modifies the prices of property." 
10 A Varimax rotated factor analysis provided two easily identifiable separate factors. 
The first factor included component loadings no lower than 0.5 I 6 for the eight items used 
on the Social Hostility scale (see above) while the three Policy Hostility items (see below) 
loaded at no higher than 0.217. For the second factor, all three Policy Hostility items 
loaded no lower than 0.690 while the eight Social Hostility items loaded no higher than 
0.321. 
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Respondents were permitted to give either "yes" or "no" re-
sponses to all eight questions. Positive responses to each of these 
questions are considered hostile and given a score of" 1." Nega-
tive responses, in tum, are not hostile; each negative response 
comes with a score of "O." To create the composite measure of 
Social Hostility, respondents' scores on the eight items were 
summed. The social hostility variable thus ranges from "O" (not 
hostile ) to "8" (highly socially hostile). The Cronbach's a. of 
0.78 indicates that the scale is highly reliable (Nunnally 1978; 
Spector 1982). 
Policy Hostility taps a stronger sentiment. It refers to feelings 
of aversion towards the presence of foreigners in the five nations 
under consideration. Specifically, it refers to a desire for the cir-
cumscription of the foreigners' rights, their expulsion, or both. 
Three items are used to construct the policy hostility scale. They 
asked respondents their opinions about the number of immi-
grants in the country, whether their presence was beneficial, and 
whether their rights should be circumscribed. The three questions 
were recoded to provide equal weight for similar responses. The 
politically hostile questions, with their respective range of an-
swers, are the following: 
• "Generally speaking, how do you feel about the nwnber 
of people of another nationality living in our country: 
Are there too many [recoded value = "3"], a lot but not 
too many [value= "I '1, or not many [value= "O"]?" 
• [falking about people living in our country who are nei-
ther (nationality) nor citizens of the European Commu-
nity] "Do you think we should: extend their rights 
[value= "O"], restrict their rights [value= "3"], or leave 
things as they are [value= "I"]?" 
• [[al.king about people living in our country who are nei-
ther (nationality) nor citizens of the European Commu-
nity] "Do you think that their presence here is a good 
thing [ value = "O''], good to some extent [ value = "I"], 
bad to some extent [value= "2'1, or a bad thing for the 
future of our country [value= "3"]?" 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
120 SAXTON & BENSON 
TABLE 1 
ATTITUDE FREQUENCIES FOR 
COLLAPSED SOCIAL AND POLICY HOSTILITY VARIABLES 
Social Policy 
Attitude Percent N Percent N 
Not Hostile 77.9 4212 21.9 929 
Partially Hostile 16.3 881 40.9 1735 
Hostile 5.8 312 37.2 1579 
Total N = 5405 4243 
Source: Data derived from Eurobarometer 30 
Note: Pearson Correlation between the two scales is .31 (p < .0 I). 
individuals from responding to the social hostility items in a 
manner that reflected their true feelings. That is, a type of "social 
correctness" may have suppressed "inappropriate" responses and 
obscured accurate results. Such is, in fact, the hypothesis of the 
"new" or "symbolic" racism scholars. 12 Some may also wonder if 
policy hostility is merely an uncensored version of social hostil-
ity. An ANOVA test of the social and policy hostility scales on 
racism, however, allows us to dismiss any such concems. 13 This 
12 For an introduction to such hypotheses in the American context, see McConahay and 
Hough (1976) . Their primary hypothesis is that because of the social undesirability of 
racial prejudice, people favor disguised , indirect ways to express it. We are not so inter-
ested here in how people may hide their prejudices; rather, we are concerned with overt 
manifestations of socially and politically hostile attitudes. 
13 To complete this test, a separate variable combining values for the social and policy 
hostility scales was created . The variable included five categories : (I) those who were 
"not hostile" on both hostility scales, (2) those who were "partially hostile" on one or 
both of the dependent variables, (3) those who were "hostile" on the social hostility scale 
but "not hostile" on the policy hostility scale, (4) those who were politically "hostile" but 
socially "not hostile," and (5) those who were "hostile" on both scales. Since there were 
only four "only socially hostile" cases, these were counted as missing values . The com-
posite variable was then used in an ANOVA test as an independent variable with the 
racism variable ~ependent. In order to make a claim that an expression of policy hostility 
Note continues 
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To create the composite measure of Policy Hostility, respon-
dents' scores on the three items were summed. The scale has a 
Cronbach's a reliability coefficient of .718, indicating a reliable 
scale. Values range from "0" (not hostile) to "9" (high policy 
hostility). 
RESULTS 
To facilitate preliminary visual comparisons between the two 
forms of hostility, we temporarily created collapsed versions of 
the two scales for use in Tables 1 and 2. For social hostility, re-
spondents were placed into one of three recoded categories: 
those with scores between "0" and "2" on the social hostility 
scale were recoded as "not hostile;" those with scores between 
"3" and "5" were labeled "partially hostile;" and those with 
scores between "6" and "8" were recoded as "hostile." The col-
lapsed policy hostility variable was recoded for those with a 
score between "0" and "2" (i.e., with no or very minor levels of 
hostility) as "not hostile;" those with scores between "3" and "5" 
as "partially hostile;" and those with scores between "6" and "9" 
as "hostile." 
The results in Table 1 lend empirical credence to the distinct-
iveness of social and policy hostility. Most optimistically, only 
6% of the respondents are socially hostile, and more than three-
quarters are not hostile. These figures are in sharp contrast to the 
results for policy hostility. Surprisingly, 3 7% of the respondents 
in the survey are politically hostile to the presence of the outsid-
ers, 11 while only 22% can be classified as not hostile. 
The disparity between social and policy hostility may lead to 
questions whether prevailing social mores have prevented some 
11 As a convention, both "policy hostility" and "politically hostile" refer to the same 
phenomenon. 
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test suggested that, in tenns of racism, the distinction between 
social and policy hostility is well founded: those who were "hos-
tile" on both hostility scales were significantly more racist than 
those who were "hostile" only on the policy hostility scale. The 
implication is that policy hostility is not merely a "disguised" 
version of social hostility. 
The analysis can now tum to testing the three competing hy-
potheses: economic situation, ideology, and national context. 
Table 2 presents the results from a cross-tabulation of the col-
lapsed versions of both dependent variables by country. The 
comparison allows us to ascertain whether there is any connec-
tion between nation and levels of hostility. The data reveal a 
general similarity among countries with only minor deviations. 
Specifically, the same overall pattern of a high proportion of "not 
hostile" in terms of social hostility and a low proportion of "not 
hostile" in terms of policy hostility that was seen in Table 1 is 
duplicated in Table '.2. The most noteworthy of the deviations is 
the relatively low levels of social hostility in the Netherlands and 
Germany, and that of the Netherlands concerning policy hostility. 
Also surprising is the finding that while Germany is one of the 
least socially hostile of the five countries, at the same time it is 
the second-most hostile country in the policy sense. Overall, 
though, there is only minor variation across nations. It is unlikely 
that specific national context provides the best explanation. To 
is not merely a disguised way of expressing the more socially unacceptable view of social 
hostility, the results should demonstrate statistically significant differences in the racism 
scores of the different values of the composite hostility variable (especially between the 
"only politically hostile" and the "hostile" categories). In fact, there was a significant 
difference between the scores of all the categories , with F = 135.00 (p s; 0.000) . In addi-
tion, there is a pattern of increasing racism all the way from the "not hostile" category to 
the "hostile" category. Most importantly, "socially and politically hostile" respondents 
were significantly more racist than "only politically hostile" respondents were. In short, 
there were statistically significant mean differences of racism between all of the hostility 
categories , with mean racism levels increasing for subsequent levels of the combined 
hostility scale. 
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TABLE2 




Hostility France Belgium lands Germany UK 
Social 
Not Hostile 73.9 72.9 83.5 83.4 76.4 
Partially Hostile 20.1 16.7 14.7 13.3 16.7 
Hostile 6.0 10.4 1.9 3.3 6.9 
N= 1001 1024 1006 1051 1323 
Policy 
Not Hostile 26.5 18.0 30.9 14.7 19.6 
Partially Hostile 32.4 35.8 48.4 43 .3 43.8 
Hostile 41.1 46.2 20 .7 42 .0 36.6 
N= 807 801 825 809 1001 
Source: Data derived from Eurobarometer 30 
demonstrate this more conclusively, though, all three explana-
tions are explored simultaneously. 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations of all the independent 
variables with the non-collapsed social hostility scale (values 
from 0 to 8) and policy hostility scale (values from 0 to 9). The 
correlations allow an initial comparison of the three competing 
explanations for hostility. What emerges is the clear dominance 
of the "ideology" explanation of hostility and the relatively 
weaker performance of both the "national context" and "eco-
nomic situation" explanations. 
The two highest correlations with social hostility (and the 
only two, besides education, with a correlation greater than 0.10) 
are value orientation (-0.17) and racism (0.25). Materialist ori-
entations and racist attitudes are thus highly associated with 
socially hostile attitudes. The "old" ideology variable has a 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
HOSTILE ATTITUDES TOWARD JMMJGRANTS 123 
TABLE3 
SoCIAL AND POLICY HOSTILITY wrrn IDEOLOGICAL, EcONOMIC, 
NATION, AND Socio-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
(Pearson Correlations) 
Predictors Social Policy 
Ideology 
Ideology (left-right self-placement) 0.087t 0.234t 
Value Orientation -0. 168t -0.287t 
Racism 0.250t 0.376:t 
Economic Situation 
General Economic Assessment 0.067t 0.042t 
Economic Pessimism 0.065t 0.090t 
Household Economic Situation 0.074t 0.082t 
Income -0.049+ -0.066+ 
Social Class -0.083t -0.11 It 
Occupation 0.017 0.024 
Nation 
France 0.058t 0.020 
Germany -0.087t 0.045t 
Belgium 0.088t 0.J09t 
Netherlands -0.056+ -0.135+ 
Britain -0.002 -0.035t 
Socio-demographic 
Education -0.141+ -0.242+ 
Age 0.086t 0.139t 
Ethnicity 0.071:t 0.134:t 
tP 5 0.05 (two-tailed) 
tP 5 0.QI (two-tailed) 
correlation of only 0.09, indicating that right-wing orientations 
are positively related to hostile attitudes. Correlations for the 
nation dummy variables, in contrast, range from a low of -0.002 
(not significant) for Britain to an absolute high of 0.09 for Bel-
gium and Germany. In these bivariate analyses, the preliminary 
evidence suggests that the national context hypothesis is not as 
powerful as the ideological hypothesis. Moreover, the strength of 
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the economic vulnerability thesis appears to be on par with the 
national context argument. Although the "subjective" vulnerabil-
ity variables are slightly more highly correlated with social hos-
tility than the "objective" variables, neither obtains correlations 
as strong as the ideological variables. Correlations range from a 
low of 0.02 (not significant) for the occupation variable to a high 
of -0.08 for social class. Rounding out the analysis, ethnicity and 
age obtain moderate correlations of 0.07 and 0.09, respectively. 
A similar pattern obtains with policy hostility, except that the 
results are even more favorable for the ideological arguments 
than they were with social hostility. The three strongest vari-
ables, in fact, are racism (0.38), value orientation (-0.29), and 
traditional left-right ideology (0.23). 
The three socio-demographic variables-education (-0.24), 
age (0.14), and ethnicity (0.13}-obtain generally more impor-
tant correlations with policy hostility. Among the economic pre-
dictors, the only variable with a Pearson correlation over 0.10 is 
social class (-0.11), while among the nation variables, only the 
Netherlands (-0.14) and Belgium (0.11) obtain such a correla-
tion. 
The data show that-without the benefit of controls-neither 
national context nor economic situation offers a convincing ex-
planation of social and policy hostility towards immigrants. In-
stead, education and ideology seem to hold the keys to this 
puzzle. Moreover, racism might be expected to be a more power-
ful explicator than value orientation, and value orientation 
should in tum be more powerful than traditional left-right ideol-
ogy. In order to determine the relative importance of the three 
competing explanations, however, the analysis must tum to the 
multiple regression results for social and policy hostility. 
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Table 4 reports the results from multiple regressions on the 
non-collapsed social and policy hostility scales. 14 The Beta 
weights (standardized coefficients) included in the table allow us 
to detennine the relative impact of each of the independent vari-
ables. In general, the results show the same patterns evident in 
the uncontrolled bivariate correlations of Table 3: the ideological 
variables are better predictors of levels of hostility than are na-
tional or economic factors. 15 
For social hostility, the two strongest predictors are racism 
and value orientation, respectively. One of the nation variables, 
France, does have a significant, positive relationship with social 
hostility: it is the third most powerful variable in the equation. 
The results show no statistically significant differences between 
Great Britain, Germany, and Holland, however. After racism, 
value orientation, and France, six other variables obtain statisti-
cal significance with roughly equivalent explanatory value. The 
traditional ideology variable, as expected, is positively associ-
ated with hostility. Three economic variables obtain significance: 
general economic assessment, household economic situation, and 
social class. Of the socio-demographic indicators, education dis-
plays a negative relationship with socially hostile attitudes, and 
ethnicity is positively related to social hostility. Those who are of 
14 A Pearson correlation matrix showed that inter-predictor collinearity was not problem-
atic . The two strongest inter-correlations were between education and age (-.44), and 
between education and social class (.35). 
15 The items used to construct the racism variable were not asked in Belg ium. Because of 
the importance of the variable to the test, we decided to run the multivariate regressions 
without the Belgian respondents . As a precaution, regressions on social and policy hostil-
ity were also run with the racism variable excluded . The only difference in the results on 
the social hostility equation was that Germany obtains a significant negative relationship , 
while the only differences in the policy hostility equation are that income becomes insig-
nificant and occupation attains a significant positive relationship (p = .01 ). The relative 
importance of all other variables in the two equations remained unchanged . In short, the 
general pattern of re::•1lts was similar. 
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foreign origins, and those who are more educated, are less likely 
to possess hostile attitudes towards immigrants. 
As indicated by the adjusted R2 of .11, approximately 11 % of 
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the com-
bined effect of the 15 independent variables. By all accounts, one 
TABLE4 






General Economic Assessment 
Economic Pessimism 










Adj . R2 =0.11 
Beta Std. Error 
0.043t 0.037 








































Education -0.059t 0.050 -0.120t 0.066 
Age -0.003 0.041 -0.003 0.054 
Ethnicity 0.052t 0.092 0.049t 0.121 
Constant -0.014 0.445 1.533 0.588+ 
Source: Base data derived from Eurobarometer 30 (Social Hostility : n = 2322; 
Policy Hostility : n = 1968). As the base category, the UK dummy variable was 
excluded . All coefficients (except for the constant) are standardized . 
tp $ 0.05 (two-tailed) 
tP $ 0.01 (two-tailed) 
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should expect better results when using such normally powerful 
predictors as ideology, education, and racism. Plausibly, the re-
sults are an indication that the issue cuts across traditional lines; 
this would lend credence to the "New Politics" hypothesis. As in 
Table 3, the strength of the associations with the policy hostility 
scale is greater. Once again , ideology offers a stronger explana-
tion of hostility than either economic situation or national con-
text. These results parallel the findings of the bivariate 
correlations. In total, 10 of 15 variables attained statistical sig-
nificance in this model. Comparing Beta weights, the three most 
powerful are racism, traditional left-right ideology, and value 
orientation. Racism offers the most cogent explanation of the 
three. More relevant is the finding that value orientation and left-
right ideology carry roughly equal explanatory weight with re-
gard to levels of policy hostility . This finding may have an im-
portant implication: the political battle over the future of the 
guestworkers is neither merely a matter of "New Politics" nor is 
it solely a reflection of a split along traditional ideological lines. 
Two of the nation dummy variables, Germany and France, are 
the fourth- and fifth-most powerful variables in the equation. 
Residing in either of these two countries makes a respondent 
more likely to bold hostile policy attitudes towards immigrants. 
Education closely follows these two variables, with ethnicity not 
far behind. Age does not appear to play a significant part in ei-
ther socially or politically hostile attitudes. The statistical unim-
portance of age is counter to many theoretical arguments. 
According to Legge ( 1996) "while some research has found a 
positive relationship between age and ethnocentrism ... one might 
expect a negative relationship as well" (522). In the German con-
text, Legge maintains that "the elderly have a higher probability 
of being satisfied economically; in turn, a greater economic satis-
faction should result in less anxiety towards non-Germans" 
(522). At the same time, older Europeans are more likely to be 
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less educated , more conservative ideologically, and hold more 
materialist value orientations. We believe that it is understand-
able that age drops out of the causal picture, when controlling for 
education, ideology, postmaterialist value orientations, and eco-
nomic competition. Thus, the non-significant coefficient for the 
age variable is likely because of multicollinearity. While age 
does not highly correlate individually with any of the other inde-
pendent variables, an auxiliary regression illustrates that the 
combined effects of the independent variables have an important 
dampening effect on the impact of age on both Social and Policy 
Hostility. 16 
As in the social hostility equation, three economic variables 
obtain significant relationships with policy hostility: economic 
pessimism, income, and social class. Although we expected the 
economic variables to correlate with levels of attitudinal hostil-
ity, the findings do not support those expectations. The results do 
not correspond to those studies that claim economic variables are 
the most important determinants of hostile attitudes. 17 
16 Klein's rule of thumb suggests that if the If from an auxiliary regression is greater 
than the overall If , then multicollinearity is likely a problem (Gujarati 1995). Indeed, the 
If for the auxiliary regress ion of Age is 0.29, as compared to the overall If of0 .11 for the 
Social Hostility Regression and an If of 0.28 for the Policy Hostility regression. No such 
evidence was found for the Occupation variable (auxiliary If= 0.11 ). While mulicollin-
earity reduces the significance of affected variables, it does not adversely affect the esti-
mated coefficients in other ways. 
17 Both models were also estimated using Huber/White corrected standard errors to con-
trol for the possibility of heteroscedasticity . The results are not presented in this article . 
However, there was no difference in the significance of statistics for the Policy Hostility 
model with corrected standard errors. The only difference in the Social Hostility model is 
that ideology drops top= 0.065 from p = 0.044 for a two-tailed significance test. Conse-
quently , the uncorrected standard errors are presented in Table 4. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We posited the existence of two distinct forms of attitudinal 
hostility towards immigrant "outsiders" in the developed West. 
The first, social hostility, encompasses hostile assessments of the 
immigrants' impact on the host society. The second, policy hos-
tility, entails support for anti-immigrant public policies. The re-
sults show that not only are social and policy hostility distinct, 
but that neither is simply a disguised form of racism. 
We tested three competing explanations of social and policy 
hostility: national context, economic vulnerability, and ideology. 
Theoretical expectations were low for the national context ac-
counts of attitudinal hostility. The data suggest that the answer to 
attitudinal hostility does not lie purely in factors peculiar to the 
individual nation-states of the European Union. Not only did an 
examination of the raw data reveal a basic similarity in patterns 
of both social and policy hostility across nations, but also the 
controlled multivariate regressions confirmed that the overall 
strength of the relationship between nation and hostility is rela-
tively weak. 
There is a large body of literature suggesting that economic 
vulnerability should prove to be the most powerful determinant 
of hostile attitudes. Our data do not support this assumption. De-
spite the fact that conceptualizations of both subjective and ob-
jective economic vulnerability were used to test these variables, 
neither was shown to offer a more significant account of varia-
tion in levels of hostility than ideology and education. At the 
same time, the results offer partial confirmation of the economic 
competition and economic vulnerability arguments. Though the 
picture is mixed, there is a general relationship between an indi-
vidual holding less optimistic evaluations of the economy and 
that individual holding hostile attitudes towards immigrants. 
Similarly, two "objective" indicators of economic vulnerability, 
income, and social class, obtain significance in one or both of the 
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multivariate regressions. These figures show that as both the 
economic vulnerability and economic competition arguments 
suggest, those with higher incomes and those at the higher strata 
of society are less likely to possess hostile attitudes. 
The three socio-demographic variables-age, ethnicity, and 
education - have likewise been posited as both fundamental as-
pects of vulnerability and essential determinants of hostility. As 
expected, ethnicity was shown to be an important predictor of 
hostility, and education was repeatedly one of the strongest over-
all determinants of hostile attitudes . This is consistent with a 
wide array of literature on the power of education. 18 
The findings further suggest that education appears to be a 
key ingredient in the Modernisierungsverlierer's (the young, the 
elderly, unskilled and semiskilled workers, farmers, and those 
with low levels of education) purported hostility to outsiders. 
The present study found no significant relationships between 
hostility and either age or occupation. However, the insignificant 
finding for age was likely due to multicollinearity from the com-
bined effects of the remaining independent variables. On the 
whole, given the effects of education and social class, only par-
tial support was found for the objective economic vulnerability, 
or "losers of modernization," explanation of hostility. 
Our study suggests that the most compelling explanation of 
hostility is ideology. The troika of racism, value orientation, and 
left-right ideology holds greater explanatory utility than either 
economics or national context. Racism, predictably, was found to 
be the most important determinant of hostile social and political 
attitudes towards immigrants. Both traditional left-right ideology 
18 Education is, in fact, partially an "economic" variable, since it aetennines future in-
come, but it is related to so many other {attitudinal, social, cultural, ideological) factors 
that it should be assumed unique. Hyman, Wright, and Reed ( 1975) were among the first 
to document, as their book title suggests, the Enduring Effects of Education . 
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and value orientation have a significant impact on hostility be-
yond the effects of racism. Traditional left-right ideology was the 
second-strongest predictor of politically hostile attitudes, while 
value orientation was the second or third most powerful predic-
tor variable for both forms of hostility. Controlling for racism, 
the more materialist the value orientation and the more right 
wing the ideology, the more hostile the attitudes. 
The connection between ideology and hostility is paralleled 
in the United States. According to some analysts, racial politics 
in the United States during the pre-Civil Rights era were simple 
conflicts between lofty American ideals and lowly prejudice: 
whites' responses to race issues could be reduced to how they 
felt about blacks. In contemporary American politics, however, 
one cannot infer that attitudes towards any particular policy issue 
can be construed as a "litmus test" of whites' feelings about 
blacks. The majority of whites are for direct government assis-
tance (e.g., the Head Start program) and anti-discrimination 
laws, yet against bussing and affirmative action. Sniderman and 
Piazza ( 1993, 16) refer to this diversity of opinion as "issue plu-
ralism." Ideology effectively mediates the presence or absence of 
prejudice in such policy-relevant attitudes. It is plausible that 
analogous forces are at work in the EU. 
These findings also lend credence to the "New Politics" hy-
pothesis that Europe is undergoing a shift towards a political 
split along the materialist-postmaterialist fault line. 19 Value ori-
entation indeed proved to be a robust predictor of attitudinal hos-
tility. At the same time, the evidence shows the value-orientation 
cleavage supplements-but in no way supplants-traditional 
19 The New Politics hypothesis refers only to the policy arena. Social attitudes, as mani-
fest here in social hostility, are not affected by the same process . Our results suggest that 
value orientation trumps traditional ideology as a primary determinant of socially hostile 
attitudes . 
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political dividing lines. Deep-rooted prejudices and left-right 
ideology remain powerful determinants of hostility in the policy 
arena 
In the end, our results show that attitudinal hostility derives 
from the conjunction of low levels of education and a powerful 
form of "ideological hostility" encompassing old-fashioned rac-
ist attitudes, traditional right-wing ideology, and materialist value 
orientations. The issue of immigration in Europe has become 
firmly embedded in ideology. Neither economics nor national 
context offers as convincing an explanation of the genesis of 
hostile attitudes . 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY STATISTICS-ALL VARIABLES* 
Std. 
Variable Obs. Mean Dev. Min Mu 
Policy Hostility 4208 7.567 2.482 0 9 
Soc ial Hostility 5405 1.425 1.881 0 8 
Ideology 4856 2.990 1.050 5 
Value Orientation 5108 1.961 0.654 1 3 
Racism 2536 3.863 1.733 2 8 
General Economic Assessment 5264 2.893 0.932 5 
Economic Pessimism 5143 1.815 0.697 3 
Household Economic Situation 5291 3.024 0.899 5 
Income 4399 2.466 1.125 4 
Social Class 5020 2.336 1.116 I 5 
Occupation 5319 1.355 0.608 l 3 
France 5405 0.185 0 .388 0 
Germany 5405 0.194 0.396 0 
Belgium 5405 0.189 0.392 0 
Holland 5405 0.186 0.389 0 
Britain 5405 0.245 0.430 0 
Education 5405 2.086 0.921 1 4 
Age 5395 2.586 1,078 4 
Ethnici!}'. 4028 2.760 0.481 3 
•The summary statistics for these variables are derived from all available data 
in the Eurobarometer 30 data set. 
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